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Powers, Jr.: Judicial Remedies/Constitutional Law - Mandamus and the Permissib
JUDICIAL REMEDIES/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Mandamus and the Permissible Scope of Review/Closure of a Preliminary Hearing. State of
Wyoming ex tel. Feeney v. District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 607 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1980), rehearing denied 614 P.2d 710 (Wyo.
1980).

In November of 1979 two men were scheduled to appear
before a county court commissioner for a preliminary hearing on the charge of murder. A motion was made to close
the preliminary hearing to members of the public in order
to avoid pretrial publicity, which might later threaten the
accused men's rights to a fair trial.' The presiding commissioner ordered the defending and prosecuting attorneys
to present argument on the motion at an in camera hearing.
He also refused to allow an attorney representing a local
television and radio station to appear at this hearing to
argue on behalf of the public's and the press's interest in
maintaining open judicial proceedings.2 Following the hearing the commissioner announced his decision to close the
preliminary hearing in a terse "Media Notification",' and
outlined his reasons in a decision letter that was distributed
only to the parties present at the preclosure hearing.4
The local television and radio station then petitioned the
state district court for a writ of mandamus. It alleged that
the commissioner had abused his discretion in violation of
the station's constitutional rights, and asked the district
court to order the commissioner to conduct an open preliminary hearing.
The district court judge found that he had jurisdiction
over this controversy and ordered the commissioner either
to hold an open preliminary hearing or to appear at a showCopyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. State ez rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., 607 P.2d
1259, 1271-1272 (Wyo. 1980) (Raper, C. J., dissenting), r'eh. den. 614 P.2d
710 (Wyo. 1980).
3. Media Notification, State v. Steve Little, Criminal Action No. 580-79,
Docket No. 9836; State v. Mike Howell, Criminal Action No. 581-79, Docket
No. 9835; County Court of Natrona County, Wyoming, November 13,
1979.
4. Decision Letter Re: Defendants [sic] Joint Motion to Enjoin and Restrict
Notification of Appearances and Preliminary Hearing and Other Court
Matters to the Public Media, State v. Steve Little, and State v. Mike
Howell, supra note 3.
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cause hearing in district court.' The hearing was held and
the judge found that the commissioner had in fact abused
his discretion and ordered that the preliminary hearing be
conducted in open court.'
The commissioner then, petitioned the Wyoming Supreme
Court for a writ of prohibition. He claimed that the district
judge had exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing an order that
directly infringed upon the commissioner's exercise of judicial discretion.7
On March 13, 1980 the supreme court held that, once
a presiding officer has determined that an open preliminary
hearing could pose a threat of prejudicial pretrial publicity,
the decision to close that hearing properly lies within his
judicial discretion.' Moreover, since the writ of mandamus
could not be used to control judicial discretion,' the writ of
prohibition would be issued to protect the integrity of a
judicial officer, whose exercise of discretion has been threatened by the actions of another court in excess of its jurisdiction.'"
Former Chief Justice Raper dissented and stated that
the commissioner had abused his discretion by failing to
adhere to the standards for a pretrial closure order, adopted
by the supreme court in previous cases." Furthermore he
took strong exception to the majority's apparent unwillingness to use mandamus as a means of policing these standards.
Justice Rooney also dissented and stated that the district
judge had jurisdiction to entertain the writ of mandamus
and that the issue of whether he had exercised that juris5. Writ of Mandamus: State ex rel. Harriscope Broadcasting Corp. d/b/a
KTWO Radio and Television v. Peter J. Feeney, Civil Action No. 48396,
Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., Wyoming, November 13, 1979.
6. Findings, Conclusions, Orders Ruling on Motion to Dismiss and Judgment:
Civil Action No. 48396, Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., Wyoming,
December 12, 1979.
7. A second petition for a writ of prohibition was filed on behalf of Mike
Howell, one of the two original criminal defendants. The two petitions
were consolidated by order of the supreme court. State ex rel. Feeney v.
District Court of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2, at 1262.
8. Id. at 1264.
9. Id. at 1263-64. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-30-102 (1977).
10. Id. at 1268.
11. Id. at 1268-70 (Raper, C. J., dissenting).
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diction properly could be better settled on appeal rather
than by resort to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition." On April 23, 1980 the supreme court denied a request
for a rehearing of this case and issued a further opinion.
The court repeated its earlier holding and emphasized that
the only issue properly before the court in this case was
whether the decision to close a preliminary hearing lay
within the discretion of the presiding officer. The court
never reached the issue of the commissioner's alleged abuse
of discretion, for the scope of review on a writ of mandamus
was limited to this sole issue of discretion.' Former Chief
Justice Raper again dissented and criticized the majority's
narrow application of mandamus, which failed to distinguish an attempt to control judicial discretion illegally from
a legitimate insistence that discretion be exercised without
abuse. 4 Justice Rooney joined in this dissent and filed a
statement."
This case presents several difficult questions. Whenever
a judicial proceeding is closed to the public over the timely
objection of the press, the issue of judicial censorship arises.
This issue may be framed in terms of the public's right to
be informed or in terms of the press's right to acquire
information, but the question that must always be faced is
whether the circumstances of a particular case justify such a
judicial intrusion upon the traditional principles of a free
press under the protection of the first amendment. However, in this case the Wyoming supreme court simply said
that such an issue was not properly before the court and
instead based its opinion on a narrow reading of the mandamus statutes. Such an approach, which elevates procedural
form over the consideration of an important constitutional
issue, is fairly ironic in the face of the same court's quite
proper and often repeated concern for the preservation of
the criminal defendants' sixth amendment rights.
12. Id. at 1277-78 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
13. State ex rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
at 614 P.2d 710, 713.
14. Id. at 714 (Raper, C. J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 716 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
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This note will begin by analyzing the various opinions
that this case has spawned, starting with the commissioner's
"secret" decision letter and culminating with the final supreme court opinion denying a rehearing. This analysis will
be followed by a discussion of judicial closure that will
attempt to identify the competing interests which have been
identified in similar cases. The focus will then shift to
consider the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition, as they have been applied historically and in this case.
This note will also consider whether any alternative courses
were available, which might have allowed the court to reach
the merits of this case without becoming entangled in sterile
peripheral issues.
INITIAL DECISIONS:
THE COMMISSIONER AND THE JUDGE

In his decision letter the commissioner began by stating
that he viewed this case "as a Sixth Amendment [sic] case
and not a Free Press/Fair Trial issue."'" Gannett v. DePasquale," a recent United States Supreme Court decision,
was cited as holding that "there is no constitutional public
right to access","8 which should be considered in determining
how best to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. The
commissioner also cited an earlier Wyoming case, Williams
v. Stafford. 9 In this case the Wyoming Supreme Court
adopted a strict set of standards to guide judicial officers
in determining whether to close a pretrial hearing. Briefly
summarized, these standards provide:
1) that access to court proceedings should be limited
only in exceptional circumstances; 2) that pretrial
proceedings should be open, unless the presiding
officer determines that the dissemination of information from an open pretrial proceeding would
create a clear and present danger to the fairness of
the trial, and that the prejudicial effect of such
16. Decision Letter, spra note 4, at 1.
17. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) [Hereinafter cited in text as
Gannett].
18. Decision Letter, supra note 4, at 1.
19. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1979) [Hereinafter cited in text
as Williams].
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/12
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information cannot be avoided by any reasonable
alternative means; 3) that the hearing on the proposed closure order should itself be closed to the
public in order to avoid the inadvertant dissemination of the prejudicial information; and 4) that a
proper record should be kept, establishing a factual
basis for the court's decision to grant or deny the
motion for closure.2 0
The rest of the commissioner's letter was devoted to a
discussion of the many dangers to trial fairness that a defendant must face in an open preliminary hearing. Evidence
may be offered to establish probable cause, although it may
be inadmissible at trial on the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt. 21 In this situation the commissioner concluded

that closure of the preliminary hearing was the only means
by which he could fully insulate these defendants from the
danger of prejudicial pretrial publicity.
When this case arrived in district court on the writ of
mandamus, the district judge first held that his jurisdiction over this matter had been established by Williams v.
Stafford.2" Although the judge agreed with the commissioner
that Gannett had not found a constitutional right of public
access to pretrial proceedings, he noted that the Supreme
Court had not barred actions for the relief sought here, nor
had it said that individual states could not impose stringent
standards of their own, so long as the criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial was not compromised.2 s
The judge then examined the record of the closure
hearing in light of the standards adopted in Williams and
found that:
there was no indication that the commissioner had
sought the voluntary cooperation of the press in
delaying the dissemination of potentially prejudicial information; there was nothing in the record
to support the conclusion that this was a truly
20. Id. at 325-326.
21. Decision Letter, supra note 4, at 2; See WYo. R. CRIM. PRo. 7(b).
22. Decision Letter Re: State ex rel. Harriscope Broadcasting Corp. v. Peter
J. Feeney, supra note 5, at 1. See also Williams v. Stafford, supra note 19,
at 324-25.
2. Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
23. Id.
Published
by at
Law
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"exceptional case", which would require closure;
and there was no evidence that the commissioner
had considered reasonable alternative means, such
as the sealing of documentary exhibits. 4
Upon these findings, the district court judge concluded that
the commissioner had a duty to conduct an open preliminary
hearing and that his failure to do so was an abuse of discretion for which the writ of mandamus would lie.
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

The majority's analysis of this case began with a consideration of whether the district court had jurisdiction
over the issue in controversy. Mandamus is defined by statute in Wyoming and it is expressly provided that the writ
"may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment
or to proceed to discharge any of its functions but it cannot
control judicial discretion.5 Thus, the court held that the
writ was unavailable to obtain an expeditious review of any
decision involving the exercise of judicial discretion. 6
The court then considered whether the decision to close
a preliminary hearing was an act of discretion. Citing
Williams, the court held that this decision was in fact an
act involving the exercise of judicial discretion.27 Under this
definition the writ of mandamus would lie to compel an open
preliminary hearing, only if there was no evidence of any
possible threat to a defendant's fair trial rights. In this
case the court held that the possibility of evidence being
made public at an open preliminary hearing, which might
not be admissible at trial, was a sufficient threat to the
defendants' fair trial rights to confer discretion upon the
commissioner."8
Next the court evaluated the rights of the press and
public under both the Wyoming and the United States con24. Id. at 2.
25. WYo. STAT. § 1-30-102. [Emphasis added].
26. State ex rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
at 607 P.2d 1259, 1264.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1265.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/12
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stitutions. The court held that the closure order was not a
prior restraint of protected first amendment rights, 9 and
cited Gannett as holding that the public had only an "interest" in open pretrial proceedings, that did not rise to the
level of an independent constitutional right of access."
Moreover, since the criminal defendant had no right to
compel a closed hearing over the objection of the prosecution and/or the presiding officer,' any public interest was
adequately protected by the actual participants to the litigation."2
Summarizing its holding, the court wrote that once the
commissioner's discretion had come into play on the issue
of protecting the defendants' fair trial rights from prejudicial pre-trial publicity, "this discretion cannot be tested by
mandamus unless the doctrine ... and the statute ... must
submit to overriding constitutional rights of strangers to
the pretrial proceedings.3 Thus the writ of mandamus was
not available as a vehicle to review the commissioner's alleged
abuse of discretion. The court concluded that the writ of
prohibition would lie against the district court since the
judge had exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing the writ of
mandamus. The supreme court said that this course was
dictated by the necessity of protecting the commissioner
from an illegal attempt to interfere with the proper exercise
of his judicial discretion. 4
In his dissent former Chief Justice Raper stated that,
while mandamus should not be used to control judicial discretion, the statute should not be construed to "authorize
abuse of discretion."3 " He argued that since the supreme
court had adopted standards for pretrial closure in Williams
that were intended to guide officers in the exercise of their
discretion, the district court clearly had jurisdiction to review the decision to close this preliminary hearing to deter29. Id.

at 1266.

30. Id.

31. Gannett v. DePasquale, supra note 17, at 382.
32. State ex rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
at 607 P.2d 1259, 1266-67.
33. Id. at 1267.
34. Id. at 1267-68.
35. Id. at 1268 (Raper, C. J., dissenting).
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mine whether those standards had been strictly applied. The
district judge had found that the commissioner had violated
those standards, and therefore the writ of mandamus was
a proper remedy to vacate the closure order." The former
Chief Justice particularly criticized the commissioner's decision to exclude the press's legal representative from the preclosure hearing. 7 In conclusion, he wrote "there was no
application of the approved standards for closure, and thus
the closing was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion."8

Justice Rooney based his dissent upon the principle that
a writ of prohibition should only be used to test whether a
court has the jurisdiction to proceed to a legal resolution of
the issue before it, not whether the court has exercised its
jurisdiction properly. 9 Since the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ of mandamus under the Williams
decision, he felt that the supreme court should not use the
extraordinary writ of prohibition to reach the issue of
whether the district court had improperly exercised that
jurisdiction in this particular case, when the same issue
could be raised by appeal.4"
When this issue returned to the supreme court on a
petition for a rehearing, the court reaffirmed its basic
holding that the decision to close a preliminary hearing
necessarily involved an act of judicial discretion. Therefore,
it could not be reviewed "upon the wings of a writ of mandamus."'" The court limited its holding to this principle and
stated that it had not even considered "whether Commissioner Feeney had or had not properly conformed to the
standards of Williams."4 Thus, the issue before the court
was not whether the commissioner had abused his discretion, but rather whether under the facts of this case he had
"a right to exercise discretion."8
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1269-70 (Raper, C. J., dissenting).
Id. at 1271-72 (Raper, C. J., dissenting).
Id. at 1276 (Raper, C. J., dissenting).

39. Id. at 1277 (Rooney, J., dissenting).

See also 63 AM. JuR. 2d Prohibition

§ 31 (1972).
40. Id. at 1278 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
41. State ez rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,

at 614 P.2d 712.
42. Id. at 713.
43. Id. at 713. [Emphasis by the court].
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Former Chief Justice Raper renewed his dissent and
wrote that "[b]efore the question of discretion can even be
considered, there must be a proper hearing, which there
was not; and there must be evidence presented upon which
to base closure, applying the ABA standards adopted by
this court in Williams v. Stafford, which there was not."4
According to this evaluation, the district judge had not
attempted to control the exercise of another judicial officer's
discretion, but rather had acted to correct a gross abuse of
discretion for which mandamus was the only effective
remedy.45
THE DECISION TO CLOSE:

A COMPARISON OF SEVERAL CASES

An inherent tension exists between the United States
Constitution, which guarantees every criminal defendant
the right to a "speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury,"4 and the tradition of open judicial proceedings, supported by the principle that "justice cannot survive behind
walls of silence."4 In recent years this tension has been
heightened by the public media's vigorous assertion of a
right of access to judicial proceedings under the free press
and free speech guarantees of the first amendment.4" Courts
are keenly aware of the potential ability of an unrestrained
and irresponsible press to vilify a particular defendant to
the ultimate prejudice of his right to due process under law,
especially when a defendant has been charged with an
unusually vicious or sensational crime. 9 The Supreme Court
has said that, although convictions that have been obtained
in the tainted atmosphere of pretrial publicity may be
reversed on appeal, such "reversals are mere pallitives;
the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent
the prejudice at its inception."" ° However, these remedies
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. (Raper, C. J., dissenting). [Citations omitted].
Id. at 715-16 (Raper, C. J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 47, and Irwin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717
(1961).
50. Shepard v. Maxwell, upra note 47, at 363.
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must be balanced by the realization that public confidence
in our legal system rests largely upon the ability of every
citizen to satisfy himself that those individuals who administer the law in his name have done so correctly, competently
and responsibly.5 The importance of the press's ability to
collect and disseminate this necessary public information
should not be lightly dismissed.52
A court clearly has the power to limit public access to
judicial proceedings, whenever it has determined that such
actions are necessary to protect a defendant's rights. In fact
the court has an affirmative duty to exercise this power,
especially when an unrestrained press threatens to destroy
the essential dignity of the judicial process by reducing the
proceedings to the level of a public spectacle."
However, the courts do not enjoy an entirely free hand
in determining just how to police the coverage of their
proceedings. For example, prior restraints or "gag orders"
have been generally condemned as violations of the first
amendment.54 Before a court can impose such restraints,
it must conduct a prior hearing and inquire into the nature
of any attendant publicity. The court must weigh the publicity's potential for prejudice, consider whether any alternative measures might be available to mitigate the danger
of such prejudice, and finally evaluate just how effective
such a restraint would actually be. 5 The thrust of these
opinions charges the courts with a dual responsibility not
only to protect the criminal defendant's rights, but also to
do so in a manner that does not sweep too broadly or compromise the importat public interest in maintaining an open
system of justice.
In Wyoming the issue of a pretrial closure first arose
in the case of Williams v. Stafford, when representatives of
the press petitioned the supreme court for a writ of prohibition, voiding the decision of a justice of the peace to close a
51. Crowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) ; Gannet v. DePasquale, supra
note 17, at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. See Shepard v. Maxwell, supra note 47, at 357.
54. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
55. Id. at 562-67.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/12
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bail hearing. The court held that prohibition would not lie
under the circumstances, but that the writ of mandamus
would lie, "if any remedy [was] in fact justified."" The
court acknowledged that "access to court proceedings should
be limited only in exceptional circumstances" and adopted
a set of standards to guide judicial officers in future decisions involving pretrial closure.5" However, the court declined
to apply these standards in the immediate case, since the
justice of the peace had had no such standards to measure
her actions, when she originally exercised her discretion
and ordered the bail hearing closed.58 Thus the court ultimately denied the press's request for relief."
Throughout this opinion the court displayed an awareness that the decision to close a pretrial hearing must involve "a balancing of the public's right of access to information ...and the defendant's right to a fair trial.""° The
need to show extraordinary circumstances, the adoption of
a set of standards and the demand for a proper record in
all future closure hearings all indicate a belief that open
proceedings should be the norm and that closure should be
authorized only on those rare occasions, when nothing else
will adequately protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Although the court declined to review the actions of the
justice of the peace in this case, because "there were no
extant standards to either guide her or against which we,
as a reviewing court, [could] test her discretion,"1 such
standards were now in place, and in the future reviewing
courts would be responsible to see that these standards were
applied and followed.
In Gannett v. DePasquale the United States Supreme
Court considered the issue of closure in the context of a
pretrial suppression hearing. The Court held that the sixth
amendment's guarantee of a public trial inures solely to the
benefit of the criminally accused."2 Therefore members of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Williams v. Stafford, supra note 19, at 324.
Id. at 325-26. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 327. [Emphasis added].
Id. [Emphasis added].
Gannett v. DePasquale, supra note 17, at 379-81.
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the public had no constitutional right under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to insist upon access to a pretrial
hearing, which has been closed to protect a defendant's right
to a fair trial.63
The petitioners in Gannett also staked a claim to a right
of access under the first and fourteenth amendments. The
Court declined to rule on this issue, but did note in arguendo
that, if any such right did exist, it had been "given all
appropriate deference by the state nisi prius court."64 Justice Powell departed from the majority on this point and
in his concurring opinion held that the press did indeed
have a constitutionally protected interest in being present at
the pretrial suppression hearing under the first amendment. 5 Although Justice Powell concluded that this interest
did not rise to the level of an absolute right, nevertheless,
he identified three factors that he considered critical to his
review of this case. First, the trial court had considered
reasonable alternatives to closure and had found them to be
inadequate to the task of protecting the defendants' rights.
Second, the order itself had been tailored to protect the
defendants' substantive rights with a minimum of excess.
Third, representatives of the press had been given an opportunity to appear before the court in order to voice their
objections to the proposed closure order.6 Under these circumstances the petitioner's interest had not been unreasonably or arbitrarily infringed, and so Justice Powell concurred with the majority."
In Gannett the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of certain constitutional limits that must be considered
63. Id. at 391.
64. Id. at 392. The Court specifically noted that despite the failure of the
press to make a contemporaneous objection the trial court had given the
press' legal representative an opportunity to object to the proposed closure
order. Thus the Court felt that the trial court must have recognized a
"putative" right of access, and therefore that the subsequent decision to
close the suppression hearing was only taken after this right had been
balanced against the defendants' rights.
65. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring). This constitutional interest does not
arise from any special status of the press as such. Rather it is founded
upon the role of the press as a public agent, collecting and disseminating
information for the public's benefit. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 400-01 (Powell, Jr., concurring).
67. Id. at 403 (Powell, J., concurring).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/12
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"
and respected in any decision to close a pretrial hearing.
While the Court declined to recognize a first amendment
right of access, it commended the trial court for extending
some degree of protection to this putative right. Indeed
Justice Powell specifically based his concurrence upon a
close examination of the record, which established to his
satisfaction that the trial court had properly balanced the
interests of the public against the rights of the defendants.
The four dissenting justices stated that the public did have
a right to open judicial proceedings under the sixth amendstanment and would have imposed a strict and necessary 69
A
hearing.
dard upon any decision to close a pretrial
common theme emerges from these opinions. The decision
to close a pretrial suppression hearing should not be taken
lightly, for the court must strike a very delicate balance.
Moreover, all these opinions endorse the use of a preclosure
hearing at which all interested parties, including the press,
have an opportunity to present arguments for or against
the motion to close. The public's interest must be respected
at least to this extent.

Applying the principles of Williams and Gannett to the
facts of the instant case, several serious inconsistencies
appear. These inconsistencies go to the heart of the commissioner's initial decision to close the preliminary decision
and leave serious questions about his ability to strike the
kind of balance between the public's interest and the defendants' rights that these previous decisions appear to call for.
First, the commissioner spoke in his decision letter of
the "many dangers" to the defendants' fair trial rights that
0
could arise at an open preliminary hearing." In particular
he expressed his concern about an affidavit which consisted
largely of hearsay. While admissible at the preliminary
68. The exact character and full extent of these constitutional limits is somewhat unclear due to the number of opinions filed (four opinions concurring
and one concurring in part and dissenting in part) and to the alternative
first amendment and sixth amendment analyses employed by the several
members of the Court. However, only Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist held that there was no public interest in open pretrial proceedings under either theory.
69. Id. at 432-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Decision Letter, supra note 4, at 1-2.
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hearing,71 this evidence would likely be subject to exclusion
at trial. The commissioner obviously felt that, if he received
this material in open court, the resultant publicity could
prejudice the entire trial process. While the commissioner
cannot be faulted for his deep concern about the effects of
such information upon the defendants' fair trial rights, the
problem would appear to be inherent in the nature of the
preliminary hearing, as established by the Wyoming Rules
of Criminal procedure. This then raises the possibility that
any preliminary hearing may be closed, whenever the state
intends to introduce evidence whose admissibility at trial
is questionable. The door would then be open to numerous
and repeated closures that would make a mockery of the
supreme court's holding that "access to court proceedings
should be limited only in exceptional circumstances."7
The commissioner also wrote of his apprehension that
pretrial dissemination of prejudicial information could make
this case reversible on appeal." However, the line of cases
that initially established the trial court's responsibility to
protect a defendant and to protect his rights to due process
arose in cases where the antics of an irresponsible, uncontrolled press threatened to turn the courtroom into a circus,7
or where the coverage attendant to a particular crime has
had a demonstrable impact upon the "impartiality" of the
local jury pool.7 5 The Supreme Court has also said that
"[t]aken together, [the] cases demonstrate that publicityeven pervasive, adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead
to an unfair trial. 7 6 Thus the mere threat of adverse publicity should not be a sufficient basis for the peremptory
exclusion of the press, unless other complicating factors are
present.
Finally, the commissioner refused to allow the press to
be represented by counsel at the preclosure hearing. His
71. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 7(b). "The finding of probable cause may be based upon
hearsay evidence in whole or in part."
72. Williams v. Stafford, supra note 19, at 325.
73. Decision Letter, supra note 4, at 2.
74. Shepard v. Maxwell, supra note 47.
75. Irwin v. Doud, supra note 49.
76. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, supra note 54, at 554.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/12

14

Powers, Jr.: Judicial Remedies/Constitutional Law - Mandamus and the Permissib

1981

CASE NOTES

801

reasons for this decision do not appear in his decision letter.
While the Wyoming supreme court did say in Williams that
"[t]he portion of the pretrial proceeding involved in the
determination of closure shall, itself, be closed to the public,"" there is no evidence that this ban was intended to
include the legal representatives of the press. Moreover, the
Gannett decision was based partially upon the fact that the
trial court had in fact allowed just such a appearance with8
out compromising the defendant's sixth amendment rights."
Any decision to close a judicial proceeding bears heavily
upon the press's ability to acquire important public information and through this upon the general public's right to
be reasonably informed. At the very least a closure order
imposes a delay of indeterminate length upon the availability of information about the courts and their functions.
Such a "delay", supported as it is by the full weight and9
authority of the state, raises sensitive issues of censorship.
The commissioner's decision to exclude the legal representative of the press from the preclosure hearing only heightens
the potential for abuse.
However, the Wyoming supreme court never reached
these issues, because it determined that this case was controlled not by constitutional considerations but rather by a
studied application of the Wyoming mandamus statutes. In
so doing, it chose to leave these issues unsettled for the
present moment in favor of a more limited procedural approach. This note will now consider this approach.
THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
AND THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

In Wyoming the writ of mandamus will not lie to review
or test an act of judicial discretion." This rule has been
incorporated into the literal language of the Wyoming mandamus statutes, which provide that the writ "cannot control
judicial discretion.""' Thus the several complex issues of this
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Williams v. Stafford, supra note 19, at 326.
See text accompanying notes 64-67, supra.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, supra note 54, at 560.
Marsh v. State Board of Land Comm'rs, 7 Wyo. 478, 53 P. 292, 295 (1898).
WYO. STAT. § 1-30-102 (1977).
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case were reduced to one question of deceptive simplicity:
Was the decision to close the preliminary hearing an act
within the commissioner's judicial discretion? The court
held that the decision had been "formulated through the
proper exercise of [the commissioner's] discretion,"" and
therefore the writ of mandamus could not lie in this jurisdiction.
The application of this rule depends largely upon the
meaning attached to the phrase, "judicial discretion". The
exercise of judicial discretion may be limited by principles
and rules of law, and the failure to conform to such accepted
principles may amount to no exercise of discretion at all,
but rather may be an "abuse of discretion,18 4 manifesting
an open disregard for a legally charged duty. In such a case
some jurisdictions will allow mandamus to lie not to control
the exercise of discretion, but rather to "confine the lower
tribunal to the sphere of its discretionary powers.""
This concept can be illustrated by a recent South Dakota
case, which presented many of the same issues that were
before the Wyoming supreme court in the instant case. In
Rapid City Journal Company v. Circuit Court of the Eighth
Judicial Circuit" members of the press petitioned the supreme court for a writ of mandamus, after a circuit judge
had ordered the closure of a preliminary hearing and had
refused to consider the press's request for a preclosure
hearing. An earlier case had held that such a hearing was a
82. State ex rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist. supra note 2,
at 607 P.2d 1259, 1267.
83. Discretion, legal and judicial: "These terms are applied to the discretionary acts of a judge or court, and mean discretion bounded by the rules and
principles of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, or unrestrained. . . . It is
a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by
law and is not to give effect to the will of the judge but to that of the
law." BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 419 (5th ed. 1979).

84. Abuse of discretion "is synonymous with a failure to exercise a sound,
reasonable, and legal discretion. . .
A discretion exercised to an end or
purpose not justified by and clearly against reason and evidence. Unreasonable departure from considered precedent and settled judicial custom,
constituting an error of law. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 10 (5th ed. 1979).

See Eager v. Derwitsch, 68 Wyo. 251, 264, 232 P.2d 713 (1951).
85. 52 AM. JuR. 2d Mandamus § 310 (1970).
86. Rapid City Journal Company v. Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial
Circuit, 286 N.W.2d 125 (1979).
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prerequisite to the closure of trial proceedings,87 but the
circuit judge had concluded that this holding did not apply
to a motion to close a pretrial proceeding. 8 The supreme
court did not try to review his decision to close the preliminary hearing, for mandamus will not lie to control the
exercise of judicial discretion in South Dakota any more
than it will in Wyoming." Instead the court simply ordered
the circuit judge to conduct an open preliminary hearing,
unless and until he conducted a proper preclosure hearing at
which the press could be represented. The discretion of the
circuit judge was not compromised. The decision to close or
not to close was left in his hands. The supreme court simply
ordered him to discharge his legal duties in a manner consistent with precedent and established principles of law.
The writ of mandamus lies to compel "the performance
of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty."'" In
Rapid City Journal the South Dakota supreme court found
a duty in the circuit judge's responsibility to conduct a
proper preclosure hearing and his failure to discharge this
duty voided his initial decision to close the preliminary
hearing. However, the supreme court did not attempt to
substitute its collective judgement for that of the circuit
judge, for, if he proceeded to conduct a proper preclosure,
then the ultimate decision to grant or deny the motion for
closure would be within his discretion and would be reviewable only on appeal.
In State ex rel. Feeney the district court found that
"the requirements for closure of a pretrial hearing have not
been met," 2 and therefore simply ordered that the preliminary hearing should be held in open court. Thus, while the
commissioner had determined that an open preliminary
87. Rapid City Journal Co. v. Tice, Jr., 283 N.W.2d 563, 568 (1979). "Those
present in the courtroom when a motion for closure is made must be afforded notice and a hearing prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion."
88. Rapid City Journal Co. v. Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit,
supra note 86, at 126.
89. Heintz v. Moulton, 55 S.D. 95, 225 N.W. 54 (1929).
90. Rapid City Journal Co. v. Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit,
supra note 86, at 126.
91. S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 21-29-1. The Wyoming statute uses the same
language. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-30-102 (1977).
92. Findings, Conclusions, Orders-Ruling on Motion to Dismiss and Judgment,
supra note 6, at 2.
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hearing would pose an unreasonable threat to the defendants' fair trial rights, the district judge apparently felt
that he could impose his personal evaluation upon the facts
as they appeared in the record, and thereby supersede the
commissioner's judgment. However, mistaken or not, the
commissioner's decision to close the preliminary hearing was
clearly within the area of his judicial discretion, charged
as he was with the responsibility of protecting the fair trial
rights of the two men in the custody of his court.
Perhaps a more limited attack upon the commissioner's
preclosure procedure would have been more fruitful. Under
Gannett the commissioner had a duty to conduct a proper
hearing at which all interested parties could be represented.
At least in this one area he should have had no discretion.
Although this approach would not have guaranteed an open
preliminary hearing, since the ultimate decision to close or
not to close would remain within the commissioner's discretion, nevertheless the press's interest would be represented
by counsel of their own choice, thus assuring that the commissioner would be presented reasoned arguments against
the proposed closure or in favor of less restrictive measures.
The supreme court has put its faith in the actual litigants
to represent and protect the public's interest,93 but it is at
least questionable whether any prosecutor will strenuously
resist a defendant's motion to close a hearing, when in reality
he has nothing to gain and everything to lose, even if he were
successful.
The Wyoming supreme court has reserved any question
of alleged abuse of discretion, until that question can be
presented on appeal. 4 However, the court does not address
the question of how the press should prosecute such an appeal
as a non-party to the original action and without a record
of the proceedings below. Certainly the "Media Notification",
issued by the commissioner to announce his decision to close
the preliminary hearing, could not form the basis for such
93. State ex rel.
at 607 P.2d
94. State ex rel.
at 614 P.2d

Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
1259, 1266.
Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
710, 713.
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an appeal, except perhaps for vagueness. 5 An improper
closure order immediately and irreversibly harms the public's interest in open judicial proceedings, yet no one may
appear in court to represent this interest, while the court
itself need not publish its findings and conclusions until
some such time as it may determine to be proper. Moreover,
since pretrial closure orders generally involve only a temporary "delay" in the eventual publication and dissemination
of public information, by the time an appeal can be perfected,
an empty victory will likely be the best remedy available to
a media appellant, soothing to the ego but devoid of any real
substance."8
THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION:
A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION

The writ of prohibition has been generally defined as
"one which commands the person or tribunal to whom it is
directed not to do something which, by the suggestion of the
relator, the court is informed he is about to do."9 The emphasis is on restraining the inferior tribunal in order to
prevent the exercise of powers that go beyond the legal scope
of its jurisdiction. The Wyoming supreme court has previously held that "the writ of prohibition is only available
if the lower court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction
'
or, having such jurisdiction, it exceeds the scope thereof,"
but it has also been held that "a mistaken exercise of jurisdiction or of its acknowledged powers by an inferior court
will not justify resort to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition."9
95. Media Notification, supra note 3. "After hearing the Defendant's Motion
for Closure of the Preliminary Hearing in the Natrona County Court. I
have prepared a decision letter closing from the public the preliminary
hearing, the record of the closure hearing, the court file and the decision
letter containing findings of fact and conclusions of law until further
order of the court or until they can be released at a future time, without
the effect of prejudicial pretrial publicity to the Defendant's right to an
impartial jury."
96. State ex rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
at 614 P.2d 710, 715-16. (Raper, C. J., dissenting).
97. 63 AM. JuR. 2d Prohibition§ 2 (1972).
98. Williams v. Stafford, supra note 19, at 324.
99. State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court of the Town of Jackson, 567 P.2d
698, 700 (Wyo. 1977).
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In State ex rel. Feeney the supreme court held that "the
issuance by the district court of its writ of mandamus
against Commissioner Feeney was in excess of its subjectmatter jurisdiction,"' 0 and therefore subject to the writ of
prohibition. Yet both the state constitution and the applicable statutes clearly give the district courts the authority
to issue writs of mandamus."' The district court made a
determination that the commissioner in this case had a duty
to hold an open preliminary hearing and issued a mandate
to that effect. If this determination was wrong or mistaken,
then the proper remedy should have been an appeal. 2 In
any case the district court had entered its decision and its
action was complete; nothing was left to restrain.' 3 Thus
the majority's decision to use prohibition in this fashion
directly contravenes the general rule that the writ should
not lie, if the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law. 4
CONCLUSION

In this case the supreme, court has strained to avoid the
serious constitutional issues that are implicit in any court's
decision to close its doors to the public. While not disagreeing
with the basicpremise that "[m]andamus cannot be utilized
to test the abuse of discretion of a lower court judicial
officer,"' 1 5 there is no reason to defer to the discretion of a
judicial officer, when uncontradicted facts clearly show that
he has neglected to conduct a proper hearing in arriving at
his decision. Under this holding any time a judge, court
commissioner or justice of the peace invokes his powers of
"discretion", thepress and the public shall be peremptorily
excluded without even an opportunity to be heard. Such
license has nothing in common with judicial discretion.
100.
.t
101.
102.
1
103.

State ex rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
a 607 P.2d 1259, 1268.
WYO. CONST. art. 5, §10. WYO STAT. § 1-30-102 (197-7).
State ex rel. Feeney v..Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
at 607 P.2d -1259,,1277-78. , (Rooney,'J., dissenting).
See Williams v. Stafford, supra note 19, at 324. "The function of a writ

of prohibition is: to prevent action and- not to undo that which has already
104.
105.

been done."
State ex rel. Sheehen v. Dist. Ct. of the Fourth Judicial Dist., 426 P.2d 431,
437 (Wyo. 1967).
State ex rel. Feeney V. -Dist. Ct. of-the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2,
at 614 P.2d 710, 713.
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The constitutional issues that the Wyoming supreme
court refused to consider in State ex rel. Feeney will not
disappear by themselves, and the United States Supreme
Court has not spoken its last words on the issue of pretrial
closure. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia ' the
Court considered whether a trial judge could constitutionally
order the closure of a criminal trial at the request of a
defendant, unopposed by the prosecution but "without any
demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration requires closure."1 7 Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion held that "[a]bsent an overriding
interest articulated in findings," the first amendment requires that the trial of a criminal defendant be open to the
public. 0 8 While this case may be factually distinguished from
the pretrial contexts of Gannett, Williams and State ex rel.
Feeney, it establishes a first amendment right of access to
the criminal trial itself. Justice Stevens, concurring with
the Chief Justice, declared quite simply that "an arbitrary
interference with access to important information is an
abridgement of the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment."'0 9
Thus the first amendment right of access, that the
Court initially declined to recognize in Gannett,"' was
accorded considerable protection within the context of the
trial itself. Whether this right of access could or should be
extended to protect the public press's interest in open pretrial hearings was not decided in this case. Justice Stewart,
who wrote the majority opinion in Gannett, expressly reserved this issue in his concurring opinion."' In any case,
the Wyoming supreme court's declaration, that "the public
has no constitutional right under the First or Sixth
amendments to the United States Constitution . . . to have
106.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, .

U.S.

, 100

S.Ct. 2814

(1980).

Id. at 2821.
Id. at 2830.
Id. at 2831 (Stevens concurring). [Emphasis added].
Id. at 2840 (Stewart concurring). In this opinion Justice Stewart correctly noted that only Justices Powell and Rehnquist reached the first amendment issue in Gannett. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text, supra.
111. Id. at 2840 (Justice Stewart concurring)..

107.
108.
109.
110.
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free access to such preliminary-hearing proceedings,
prove to be premature.

'

may

The Supreme Court has recognized that the remedy of
appeal cannot adequately protect a defendant's right to a
fair trial. It should be equally apparent that the reversal of
a closure order on appeal cannot fully protect the public's
interest in open judicial proceedings from the potential
abuses inherent in this decision.
GEORGE POWERS

112. State ex rel. Feeney v. Dist. Ct. of the Seventh Judicial Dist., supra note 2.
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